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GHOST PRISONERS AND BLACK SITES: EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Leila Nadya Sadat t
I. INTRODUCTION
The waging of war inevitably involves the taking of prisoners, and
the U.S. "Global War on Terrorism" ("GWOT")' has been no exception.
Some prisoners have been detained abroad at the behest of the United States
government; others are held in U.S. interrogation facilities in the U.S. or
abroad, such as the prisons at Guantanamo Bay (Cuba); Bagram Air Force
Base (Afghanistan) or Abu Ghraib (Iraq); others, it has even been alleged,
are being held at sea. 2 Human Rights groups have probably over-estimated
the total number of prisoners to be as high as 70,000;3 the number of known
prisoners in Iraq, Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay, and U.S. prisons
according to available published sources is more consistent with a figure of
12,000 or 15,000. 4 Whatever the total number of prisoners, the legal

t Henry H. Oberschelp Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri. I
am grateful to Professor Detlev Vagts for his substantial contribution to this essay, and to
Diane Amann, Kathleen Clark, Stephen Legomsky and the participants in the Case Western
Reserve University School of Law Symposium: "Torture and the War on Terror" for their
helpful comments. Dorie Bertram, Claudine Chastain, Julie Lamm, Marissa Maclennan, and
Marguerite Roy provided helpful research assistance.
1 See Press Release, The White House, The Global War on Terrorism: The First 100
Days, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/1 O0dayreport.html.
This article does not address the threshold question of whether it is possible to characterize
the use of military force against terrorist groups as a "war" in the legal sense. Given that the
Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts were clearly international armed conflicts within the meaning
of international humanitarian law that determination is unnecessary to the discussion of the
issues raised herein. I have expressed my views of that subject elsewhere, see Leila Nadya
Sadat, Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 135 (2004)
[hereinafter Sadat, Terrorism].
2 There have been credible allegations of detention centers existing on U.S. Naval Vessels. See Association of the Bar of the City of New York & Center for Human Rights and
Global Justice, New York University School of Law, Torture by Proxy: Internationaland
Domestic Law Applicable to "ExtraordinaryRenditions" 3, 3-4 n.6 (Oct. 29, 2004), available at http://www.nyuhr.org/docs/TortureByProxy.pdf [hereinafter NY City Bar Report].
3 United States of America, Guant6namo and beyond. The Continuing Pursuit of Unchecked Executive Power, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, May 13, 2005, http://web.amnesty.
org/library/print/ENGAMR510632005.
4 See, e.g., Isabel Hilton, The 8001b Gorilla in American Foreign Policy: Alleged Terror
Suspects are Held Incommunicado All Over the World, GUARDIAN (London), July 28, 2004,
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framework governing them is clear: their treatment is governed by the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949, which have, since World War II, been the
gold standard regarding the capture, detention, treatment and trial of
prisoners of war and civilian internees. 5 Indeed, the four Geneva
Conventions enjoy unparalleled support among States, having been ratified
by 192 countries, that is, virtually every country in the world, including the
United States, Afghanistan and Iraq, 6 and are, without a doubt, part of the
customary laws of war.7 Geneva law, as it has come to be called, requires
that prisoners be treated humanely, forbids secret detention sites, and
appoints the International Committee of the Red Cross as the international
monitor for Geneva compliance. 8
Early in the GWOT, however, over the objections of U.S. Secretary
of State, Colin Powell, 9 and the State Department's Legal Advisor, William

available

at

http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4980261-103390,00.html

(alleging roughly 12,000 prisoners in Iraq and another 3,000 arrested in 100 countries
elsewhere).
5 This essay therefore does not accept the correctness of the Administration's decision not
to apply Geneva law to the conflict in Afghanistan, although certainly some of the detainees
who were members of al Qaeda, as opposed to Taliban military forces, might ultimately be
found not to benefit from the Prisoner of War ("POW") Convention under Article 4, thereof.
See generally Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III]; Sadat, Terrorism, supranote 1, at
140-42. Nonetheless, even if not classified as POWs, they would fall within the provisions of
Geneva IV, on civilians. See generally Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter
GC IV]; see also COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949:GENEVA
CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIMES OF WAR 271
(Oscar Uhler & Henri Coursier eds., 1958) [hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY]. The Bush
administration does not agree, and this remains a controversial point as regards the Afghan
conflict. See infra notes 9-1 land accompanying text.
6 ICRC, International Treaties & Documents, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO?Op
enView.
7 See, e.g., The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, 35, delivered to the Security Council, U.N.
Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993). This report was unanimously adopted by the Security Council.
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
8 Protocol I elaborates upon the Geneva Conventions, and although it has not been ratified by the U.S., many of its provisions, and particularly those regarding the humane treatment of prisoners are considered part of customary international law. See, e.g., Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 75, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
9 Memorandum from Colin Powell, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State to Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Draft Decision Memorandum for the President on the
Applicability of the Geneva Convention to the Conflict in Afghanistan (Jan. 26, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 122-23 (Karen J. Greenberg &
Johsua L. Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter TORTURE PAPERS].
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H. Taft, IV," ° lawyers in the U.S. Department of Justice argued that the
United States should abandon the provisions of the Geneva Conventions in
favor of a de novo legal regime that they believed would be superior for the
capture, detention, treatment and trial of enemy prisoners, whether captured
in the United States or abroad. In the words of then Counsel to the
President, Alberto Gonzales:
[T]he war against terrorism is a new kind of war. It is not the traditional
clash between nations adhering to the laws of war that formed the backdrop for [the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention] .... In my judgment,

this new paradigm renders obsolete Geneva's strict limitations on questioning
of enemy prisoners and renders quaint some of its provisions...
,,11
President Bush ultimately accepted the Department of Justice's arguments, and issued a memoranda declining to apply Geneva law to either
al Qaeda or Taliban detainees in U.S. custody.' 2 A diplomatic and legal
furor ensued, particularly after the transfer of prisoners from Afghanistan to
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where bound prisoners were initially held in outdoor cages and were denied any right to challenge the status of their detention or their treatment. The extremely negative international reaction generated by the creation and operation of the U.S. prison at Guantanamo Bay, as
well as other U.S. detention centers, is summarized by the words of Amnesty International, which, in its latest annual report, suggested that the U.S.
'1 3
detention center at Guantanamo Bay had become the "gulag of our times.

Memorandum from William H. Taft, IV, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State to Alberto
R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Comments on Your Paper on the Geneva Convention
(Feb. 2, 2002), reprintedin TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 9, at 129. For an excellent treatment
of this issue see Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plansand Authorizations to Violate International
Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
811 (2005).
11 Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President to George W. Bush,
President, Decision Re: Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the
Conflict with AI-Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002), reprintedin THE TORTURE PAPERS,
supra note 9, at 118, 119 [hereinafter Gonzales, Geneva Memo].
12 Memorandum from George W. Bush, President to Richard B. Cheney, Vice President et
al., Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), reprinted in THE
TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 9, at 134. The memo is rather elliptical in its reasoning, concluding that al Qaeda members do not receive the protection of the Geneva Conventions
because "al Qaeda is not a High Contracting Party to Geneva." Id. at 134. As regards the
Taliban, although the memo concludes that Geneva applies to the conflict with the Taliban,
the President nonetheless determined that "the Taliban detainees are unlawful combatants
and, therefore, do not qualify as prisoners of war under Article 4 of Geneva." Id.at 135.
13 See Irene Khan, Foreword, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 2005, available at http://web.
10

amnesty.org/report2005/message-eng.
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Nearly two years after the September 11 th attacks and the Afghan
invasion, Iraq was invaded by the United States and a "coalition of the
willing,"'' 4 one justification for which was the continuation of the GWOT.15
Although the United States determined that Geneva law applied to the
conflict in Iraq, 16 the decision not to apply Geneva to the detainees captured
in the Afghan conflict appears to have spilled over to the Iraq theatre,
where, once again, credible allegations of prisoner mistreatment and
violations of international law were made against the United States. The
most visible evidence of this abuse was the shocking photos emanating from
the U.S. detention facility at Abu Ghraib. Indeed, the prisoner abuse
problem is much more serious, both quantitatively and qualitatively, as
regards detainees in Iraq, than the human rights problems experienced at
Guantanamo Bay. First, many more prisoners have been captured and held
in Iraq than in Afghanistan or Guantanamo Bay. Second, as the occupying
power of Iraq, the United States has special duties towards the individuals
living within the territory it is administering.' 7 Finally, unlike Guantanamo
Bay, which is within federal court jurisdiction, relatively proximate to U.S.
shores and poses no security risk to U.S. citizens, Iraq is far away and
remains an active theatre of hostilities in which U.S. soldiers die almost
daily. It is also probably not within the jurisdiction of U.S. Article III courts,
nor is it accessible to public observers.
Although the government has retreated from some of the more controversial policies adopted regarding the treatment of prisoners captured in
the GWOT, particularly as regards the use of torture and cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment, one aspect of government policy that appears to be
14 See Press Release, The White House, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Coalition Members
(Mar. 27, 2003) http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030327-10.html.
15 Although on September 18, 2003, President Bush stated publicly for the first time that
Saddam Hussein was not directly involved in the September 1 th attacks, the Bush administration repeatedly conflated al Qaeda and Iraq as enemies in the War on Terror, leading
more than seventy percent of all Americans to believe that Saddam Hussein was responsible
in some way for the attacks. See, e.g., Bush Administration on Iraq 9/11 Link, BBC NEWS,
Sept. 18, 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3119676.stm.
16 See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
InternationalLaw, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 461, 476-77 (2002); see also infra notes 77-78 and
accompanying text.
'7
S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003).
18 One of the most controversial memoranda of the war was the August 1, 2002 memo
from Jay Bybee to Alberto Gonzales that took the position that "[p]hysical pain amounting to
torture must be equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such
as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death." Memorandum from Jay S.
Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice to Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct for Interrogations under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted in TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 9, at 172. Additionally, the memo asserted that to any effort by Congress to interfere with the "President's
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both ongoing and supported by U.S. officials, even if not officially, is the
policy of extraordinary rendition-transferring detainees abroad for detention and interrogation either from the U.S., on behalf of the U.S., or from
occupied Iraq. Although the numbers of prisoners rendered abroad has been
relatively few, the covert nature of the operations, and the allegations of
prisoner mistreatment raise very troubling questions about the wisdom and
the legality of the U.S. rendition program. At the same time, distinguished
lawyers and even the U.S. Office of Legal Counsel have apparently supported the rendition policy by legal memos that have not been disavowed. In
Part III, this essay examines the law governing rendition from U.S. territory
or by U.S. agents-which has not been the subject of memos by government counsel, at least not insofar as is publicly known. In Part IV, the essay
explores the special case of extraordinary rendition from occupied Iraq,
examining the legal justifications for the U.S. rendition policy proffered by
the government.
Having concluded that extraordinary rendition is not permissible
under existing, applicable and well-established norms of international law,
Part V briefly explores the consequences of this illicit government activity.
Because renditions are carried out in secret, employ extralegal means, and
often result in prisoner abuse, including cruel treatment, torture, and sometimes death, they are emblematic of the larger human rights concerns that
trouble many of the detention and interrogation practices employed by the
U.S. government since September 11, 2001. Similarly, relying upon lawyers
to pen justifications for controversial government activities has been a central feature of the conduct of the GWOT, one that resurfaces in the context
of the current rendition policy. Of particular concern is that rather than explicitly amending the law or articulating clear, narrowly tailored justifications for derogating from the law, derogations that would presumably be
temporary and specific, such as the derogations permitted under international human rights treaties, 19 government officials have sought to redefine
conduct of the interrogation of enemy combatants would violate the Constitution's sole vesting of Commander-in-Chief authority in the President." Id. at 207. This memo was ultimately
repudiated by a December 30, 2004 memorandum from Daniel Levin to James B. Comey
stating "This opinion.., supersedes in its entirety the August 1, 2002 opinion of this Office." Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal

Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice to James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A
(Dec. 30, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/dagmemo.pdf. It concluded that
"'severe' pain under the statute [is not limited] to 'excruciating and agonizing' pain or to
pain 'equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ
failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death."' Id.
(citations omitted).
19 See, e.g., A v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't, [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2
W.L.R. 87 (appeal taken from Eng. (U.K.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.
uk/pa/ld2004O5/ldjudgmt/jdO41216/a&oth- 1.htm (discussing the U.K. derogations of No-
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legal norms in an exceptional burst of "executive activism" in ways that are
simply not particularly plausible or persuasive. 20 This use of legal subterfuge is deeply troubling in and of itself, as well as in regards to its potentially harmful consequences. Finally, the essay questions the efficacy, as
well as the wisdom, of these extralegal policies. Although even some human
rights advocates have argued that extraordinary measures may be necessary
to win the GWOT 2 1 those taken to date-ranging from military operations,
to extraordinary detention and interrogation practices-have created an international backlash that has substantially eroded America's standing in the
world, and may contribute to the inability of the United States to gain real
allies for its war on terror. Yet, other than the assertions of policy makers
and pundits, there has been virtually no evidence that these extraordinary
measures achieve their stated purpose.
II. THE PRACTICE OF EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION
Last Spring, an article in The New Yorker alleged that the U.S.
government, and more particularly the Central Intelligence Agency
("CIA"), was moving individuals detained as part of the U.S. "War on
Terror," to other countries using extralegal channels.2 2 According to media
reports, suspects are blindfolded, shackled and sedated before being
transported by jet to the destination country where they are typically
detained, interrogated, often tortured and sometimes killed.2 3 The most
common destination is apparently Egypt, although renditions have occurred
involving Jordan, Syria, Morocco and Uzbekistan, as well. In the words of
one former CIA agent: "If you want a serious interrogation, you send a
prisoner to Jordan. If you want them to be tortured, you send them to Syria.
If you want someone to disappear-never to see them again-you send
them to Egypt. 2 4

vember 11, 2001 from the European Convention on Human Rights and the ICCPR following
the September 11th attacks).
20

A more recent example is provided by the government's assertion that the Authorization

for the Use of Military Force ("AUMF") provides the President with authority to engage in
warrantless surveillance.
21 Michael Ignatieff, Op-Ed., Lesser Evils, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 2, 2004, available at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/opeds/20O4/ignatieff lessevilsnytm_050204.htm.
22 Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America's 'Extraordinary
Rendition' Program, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, available at http://www.newyorker.com/
fact/content/?050214fa fact6.
23 NY City Bar Report, supra note 2, at 9 (reporting the case of five individuals rendered
from Albania to Egypt, where two were executed).
24 ACLU, Extraordinary Rendition - FACT Sheet, http://www.aclu.org/safefree/extraodi
naryrendition/22203res20051206.html.
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More recently, allegations surfaced suggesting that the CIA has
been hiding and interrogating detainees at so-called "black sites"-covert
prisons set up by the CIA in eight countries, including Thailand, Afghanistan, several unspecified countries in Eastern Europe, and Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba. 25 These stunning revelations might not have raised as many concerns
as they did had there not already existed a substantial controversy concerning the legality and wisdom of the U.S. government's detention and interrogation policies regarding terror suspects, prisoners of war and even civilian
internees in the U.S., Afghanistan and Iraqi theatres in the War on Terror.2 6
The practice of "outsourcing" prisoners to foreign countries for detention, interrogation, and sometimes trial, has come to be known, somewhat euphemistically, as extraordinary rendition. 27 The stories of the individuals detained are lurid in their details, starting with hooded detainees
being spirited away in the dead of night and sent in chartered aircrafts to
remote countries where they were subjected to torture and maltreatment.28
Unofficially, U.S. officials have admitted that the practice exists; officially,
however, details have not been forthcoming.29 Some of those rendered
abroad have died or been killed; some appear to have become "ghost prisoners," held without record either by U.S. or foreign jailers; 30 others, more
25

Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH.

POST,

Nov. 2, 2005,

at Al. Similar assertions have been made by journalist Seymour Hersh in his recent book,
Chain of Command. See SEYMOUR M. HERSCH, CHAIN OF COMMAND: THE ROAD FROM 9/11
TO ABU GHRAIB 16-17, 20 (2004). Seymour asserts that pursuant to a secret finding signed by
the President, the Defense Department had been authorized to set up a "specially recruited
clandestine team of Special Forces operatives and others who would defy diplomatic niceties
and international law and snatch-or assassinate, if necessary-identified 'high-value' Al
Qaeda operatives anywhere in the world. Equally secret interrogations centers would be set
up in allied countries where harsh treatments were meted out, unconstrained by legal limits
or public disclosure." Id. at 16. European officials have not confirmed the existence of secret
C.I.A. prisons, Dan Bilefsky, No Proofof Secret C.LA. Prisons, European Antiterror Chief
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2006, at A 11.
26
Khan, supranote 13.
27
The definition of "extraordinary rendition" varies depending upon the source. The New
York City Bar Association report uses the following definition: "the transfer of an individual,
with the involvement of the United States or its agents, to a foreign state in circumstances
that make it more likely than not that the individual will be subjected to torture or cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment." NY City Bar Report, supra note 2, at 4. On the other
hand, the term is sometimes referred to any extra-judicial transfer of a prisoner from U.S.
custody to a country other than the U.S. See, e.g., Wikipedia, Extraordinary Rendition,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extraordinaryrendition.
28 See, e.g., Seth Hettena, Navy Secretly ContractedJets Used by CIA, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Sept. 24, 2005, http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,77683,00.html?ESRC=tops
tories.RSS.
29 NY City Bar Report, supra note 2, at 2.
30 The term was employed by the U.S. army in Iraq and relayed in the report of Major
General Antonio M. Taguba, on alleged abuse of prisoners by members of the 800th Military
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"fortunate," such as Maher Arar, a Syrian born Canadian citizen, have had
relatives able to alert either the press or other authorities to their disappearance, and have pressed their cause in U.S. courts and before international
commissions of inquiry investigating their allegations of abuse. 3 1 A number
of non-Iraqi prisoners were apparently secretly transferred out of Iraq from
March to September, 2004, under an unpublished legal opinion by the Bush
administration that permitted the military and the CIA to treat at least a
small number of non-Iraqi prisoners captured in Iraq in the same way as
members of al Qaeda and the Taliban captured in Afghanistan, Pakistan or
elsewhere.3 2
Although the idea of extraordinary rendition as an investigative tool
did not originate with the Bush administration, 3 3 there is no doubt that the
advent of the GWOT has brought with it a significant expansion of the practice, 34 and that the emphasis has shifted from obtaining suspects for prose-

Police Brigade at the Abu Ghraib Prison in Baghdad, Iraq. ANTONIO M.

TAGUBA, MAJOR
GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY
POLICE BRIGADE, reprinted in TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 9, at 405 [hereinafter TAGUBA

REPORT]. According to General Taguba's report, the individuals in question were apparently
held by military police without knowing their identities or the reason for their detention. Id.
These prisoners were apparently "moved around within the facility to hide them from a
visiting International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) survey team." Id.
31 See, e.g., Wendy Patten, Human Rights Watch Report to the Canadian Commission of
Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, June 7, 2005 [hereinafter HRW Report]. Arar has filed a lawsuit in U.S. District
Court. See Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Arar v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-249
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2004), available at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/september_ 1 th/docs/
ArarComplaint.pdf. Arar's initial complaint was dismissed on February 16, 2006. See
Memorandum and Order, Aar v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-249 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2006),
availableat www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/september_ I th/docs/ArarOrder21606.pdf.
32 Douglas Jehl, US. Action Bars Right of Some Capturedin Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26,
2004, at AI. This article refers to an earlier draft Justice Department Memorandum of March
2004 on the subject, which apparently led to the conclusions in the later memo, although
government officials later reported that the text of the March 2004 document had not been
incorporated into the new memo. Id. The Justice Department memo was apparently the basis
upon which one dozen non-Iraqi prisoners were transferred out of Iraq, either to other countries (such as Egypt or Saudi Arabia) or secret U.S. prisons around the world that have been
used since September 11, 2001 to house "high value" detainees. Id.
33 Extraordinary rendition was inherited and reauthorized by former President Bill Clinton
in a 1995 policy directive, PDD 39. Presidential Decision Directive 39: U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism (June 21, 1995), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm
[hereinafter PDD 39]. PDD 39 is declassified, but highly redacted. It was used during his
"War on Terror" in the 1990s. See, e.g., Jim Harland, Pricey Rendition, WASH. POST, July 3,
2005, at B7. See also NY City Bar Report, supra note 2, at 9-10. A new directive was issued
in May 1998, PDD-62; the existence of this directive is known, but the directive itself is still
classified. HRW Report, supra note 3 1, at 4 n.7.
34 HRW Report, supra note 31, at 6.
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cution,3 to transferring them for interrogation.36 A full exploration of these
issues and U.S. detention and interrogation policies more generally is beyond the scope of this short essay, and there is, in any event, an ever increasing literature on the subject. Instead, this essay explores two particular
problems: the question of extraordinary rendition of individuals from the
U.S. (or from U.S. facilities abroad or by U.S. agents) to prisons abroad;
and the special problem posed by the movement of detainees out of Iraq
during the U.S. occupation of that country.
III. NON-OCCUPATION TRANSFERS OF DETAINEES

Sometimes countries, and not just the United States, 37 arrest an individual present within their territories and transport him abroad for the
purpose of interrogation. In the U.S. case, were the individual a U.S. citizen,
such an arrest and transfer would be presumptively illegal,3 8 although there
is some evidence that it has occurred.39 Whatever confusion may exist in the
jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court as to the extraterritorial application of U.S. Constitutional law,4 ° one hopes that we are not yet at the point
at which it can seriously be argued that a U.S. citizen present in the United
States would not receive the protections of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution to be "secure in their persons" and receive "due
process of law" if deprived of his or her liberty through government ac-

35 PDD 39, supra note 33, calls for the return of terrorist suspects that are overseas to the
U.S. "by force" if necessary, "[i]f we do not receive adequate cooperation from a state that
harbors a terrorist whose extradition we are seeking .... "
36 Even though the stated purpose of PDD 39 was trial of terrorist suspects (among other
things) in the United States, cases of rendition to third countries have been documented during the pre-9/1 I period. See NY City Bar Report, supra note 2, at 9 (describing renditions to
Egypt).
37 Manfred Nowak, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture, recently singled out six countries-the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Sweden and Kyrgyzstan-for
deporting terrorist suspects to countries where they may have been tortured. See, e.g., Thalif
Deen, U.N. Blasts Practiceof Outsourcing Torture, INTERPRESs SERVICE, Nov. 10, 2005.
38 Presumably, under the U.S. Constitution, the Executive would not have the authority,
absent and perhaps notwithstanding Congressional authorization, to exile U.S. citizens, even
temporarily, for the purposes of interrogation. The U.S. Supreme Court has held in dicta that
U.S. citizens cannot constitutionally be deported. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976).
39 Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Court Asserts Authority Over American in Saudi Jail,N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 17, 2004, at A13.
40 In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), the Supreme Court
held
that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to a search of a Mexican national's property in
Mexico, even though the evidence seized was introduced at a U.S. trial. The Court found that
the "people" protected by the Fourth, First and Second Amendments, are those "who are part
of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this
country to be considered part of that community." Id. at 265.
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tion. 4 1 Even to the extent the government has asserted the power to detain
U.S. citizens without charges as part of the GWOT, detention is not tantamount to exile, and the extralegal rendition of a U.S. citizen to a foreign
government for interrogation is a power that even the government has not
asserted.42
As regards non-citizens, extralegal means of detention and expulsion are deeply problematic outside the normal processes of immigration
law or U. S. extradition law.43 Aliens whom the law regards as being within
41

U.S. CONST. amends. IV & V. The President has recently asserted the power to deprive

U.S. citizens of their Constitutional rights via their classification as "enemy combatants" in
the GWOT, an assertion accepted by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in the Padilla case,
but which remains controversial. See Padilla v. Hanfl, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005), cert
denied, 2006 U.S. Lexis 2705 (U.S. Apr. 3, 2006). Indeed, not since Korematsu v. United
States has the Supreme Court suggested that U.S. citizens may constitutionally be detained,
without having committed a criminal offense, for indefinite periods of time during war. 323
U.S. 214, 233 (1944). The re-categorization of U.S. citizens arrested in the U.S. as "enemy
combatants," unprotected by the provisions of the U.S. Constitution, may therefore not withstand judicial review, although the resolution of this issue remains to be seen. The Fourth
Circuit opinion in Padillarelies heavily upon the Quirin decision to find that "enemy combatant" citizens is a permissible category. Padilla,432 F.3d at 392-97; Ex Parte Quirin, 317
U.S. 1 (1942). The more applicable precedent, however, would appear to be Korematsu,
since the question at issue in Quirin was whether a citizen could be tried for violations of the
laws and customs of war and bring a habeas corpus petition to challenge his detention in that
case. Quirin, 317 U.S. 1; Korematsu 323 U.S. 214. On the other hand, as the dissents in
Korematsu noted, what was really at stake was the right of Korematsu to refuse his detention
without charges. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 225 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
42 As explained below, only aliens are "deportable" under the U.S. Constitution and federal law. See supra note 38 and infra note 101 and accompanying text. Of course, Yasser
Hamdi was a U.S. citizen who was ultimately transferred back to his native Saudi Arabia as
the result of his release from Guantanamo Bay. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
Note that Article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides: "Everyone
has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." Universal
Declaration of Human Rights art. 13(2), G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. H/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) (emphasis added). But see Yoram Dinstein, The
Israel Supreme Court and the Law of Belligerent Occupation: Deportations, in 23 ISR. Y.
BK. HUM. RTs. 1, 3-7 (1993) (arguing no absolute prohibition against involuntary exile)
[hereinafter Dinstein, Deportations].
43 It is obviously difficult to contemplate by what authority a person present in the U.S.
may be seized and removed from U.S. territory outside the normal processes of law. If accused of an immigration violation, the individual could be deported pursuant to U.S. immigration laws. If accused of a crime by a foreign State, the individual may be extradited pursuant to a treaty with that State, but may not otherwise be rendered for criminal prosecution
abroad. See Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 475 cmt. b n.3. In the case
of rendering a suspect to the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, for example, the U.S. entered into two Congressional-Executive agreements with
the tribunals for the purpose of rendering suspects to them. Those agreements were implemented by a federal statute that was sustained in Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 184 F.3d 419 (5th
Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1135 (2000).
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the territory of the U.S. receive Constitutional protection,4 4 and even those
detained in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, have been permitted to file a writ of
habeas corpus in order to challenge their detention. 45 At the same time, particularly following the September 11 th attacks, detention of non-citizens has
become increasingly common, 46 and some of those detainees may be removed or deported pursuant to federal statutes permitting the government to
do so on national security grounds4 -although none permit seizure and
transfer for the purposes of enabling foreign interrogation.48
Even assuming arguendo that some aliens present on U.S. territory
might escape the strictures of the due process clause and Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, and be therefore susceptible to seizure and transfer
abroad using extralegal means, they would not be deprived of all legal protection, for international human rights law nevertheless applies, even if the
non-self executing nature of the applicable human rights instruments (under
49
U.S. law) might not offer them any specific right of action in U.S. courts.
The legal problems start with the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("CAT"), 50 to
44 The Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection clauses, for example,
expressly extend to every 'person,' not just citizens. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. That choice of
language was clearly deliberate; the privileges and immunities clause of the same amendment, in contrast, is confined to U.S. citizens. Id.; see, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202
(1982) (discussing state action in section two of the Court's opinion); Mathews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (discussing federal action). The Fourth Amendment similarly extends to
aliens in the U.S. See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468
U.S. 1032 (1984) (refusing to apply exclusionary rule to deportation proceedings but recognizing the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to aliens in the U.S.).
45 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
46 See, e.g., Leila Nadya Sadat, Do All Arabs Really Look Alike? Prejudice and the US.
'War' on Terror, 50 WAYNE L. REV. 69, 75 (2004).
47 STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 844-66 (4th ed.
2005). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3) (2000) (inadmissibility); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4) (2000)
(deportability).
48 There has recently been some discussion about "denaturalizing" U.S. citizens that join
or support organizations deemed terrorist groups by the Executive Branch. Charles H.
Hooker, The Past as Prologue:Schneiderman v. United States and Contemporary Questions
of Citizenship and Denaturalization,19 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 305, 329 (2005). This would
obviously be controversial. Id. at 306.
49 To the extent that they may have suffered injuries under customary international law,
they might have a civil right of action under the Alien Tort Claims Act and The Torture
Victim Protection Act, although the latter applies, by its terms, only to actions brought for
torture and extrajudicial killings in foreign countries. See Torture Victim Protection Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992); Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(2000).
50
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT]. Article 2 of the CAT requires
the United States, as a party, to prevent torture in any territory under its jurisdiction, and does
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which the United States is a party. Article 3 of the CAT provides that a
State shall not expel, return ("refouler") or extradite an individual to a country "where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in
danger of being subjected to torture., 51 This clause is sometimes misread as
forbidding transfer only if the sending State "knows" that there will be torture. The error in such a reading is underlined by clause 2 of Article 3 of the
treaty which provides that such grounds include the existence in the State in
question of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass human rights violations.52 Information obtained by Human Rights groups and news sources
on the practice of extraordinary rendition indicate that the countries to
which individuals have been transferred include Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia,
Pakistan and Uzbekistan, 5 3 each of which has been cited by the State Department country reports on human rights practices as engaging in torture.54
When a State has been the subject of adverse comments in a Department of
State country report it is hard to see how "grounds" to believe he would be
subject to torture do not exist, meaning that rendition to those countries is
presumptively illegal. It is perhaps also worth noting that the prohibition
against torture is not only a principle of treaty law, but has generally been
considered to be a peremptory norm of customary international law from
which no derogation is permitted.55
not permit derogation from this provision even during time of "public emergency," or "threat
of war." Id.art. 2(2).
51 Id. art. 3. Similarly, Article 33 of the Refugee Convention forbids "refoulement" of a
refugee who has a well-founded fear of being persecuted on certain prescribed grounds.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137. The
Refugee Convention offers broader protection than the CAT, as it covers many forms of
persecution, not only torture. Id.
52 CAT, supra note 50, art. 3(2). As the U.S. government has itself recently conceded,
there are "no categories of aliens who are excluded from protection under Article 3 [of the
Torture Convention]." U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by
State Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention, Second Periodic Reports ofStates Parties
Due in 1999, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/48/Add.3 (June 29, 2005), available at http://hei.unige.c
h/-clapham/hrdoc/docs/USCATreport2005.pdf [hereinafter Second US. Torture Report].
53 See, e.g., HRW Report, supra note 31, at 8-11; Mayer, supra note 22.
54 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, EGYPT (2004),
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41720.htm; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, SYRIA (2004), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/
2004/41732.htm; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES,
SAUDI ARABIA (2004), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/4173l.htm; U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, UZBEKISTAN (2004), http://www.
state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41717.htm; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, PAKISTAN (2004), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/417
43.htm.
55 See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980); Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment (July 21, 2000), available at http://www.un.org/
icty/furundzija/appeal/judgement/index.htm; Regina v. Bartle - Ex Parte Pinochet, [1999]
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It could be argued that rendition for interrogation purposes to countries in which torture is regularly practiced-short of a situation in which it
is "known" that torture will follow--does not violate U.S. obligations under
the Torture Convention because at the time of ratification, the U.S. Senate
appended an understanding to the effect that "substantial grounds" under
Article 3(1) means that it is "more likely than not" that he would be tortured. 56 Yet because the "more likely than not" standard is framed as an
"understanding" as opposed to a "reservation" to the Torture Convention,
presumably it was not intended to actually modify U.S. obligations under
the treaty. Indeed, adoption of an "actual knowledge" standard does not
appear to reflect current U.S. policy regarding torture, nor would it be consonant with well established principles of treaty interpretation and international law. The Second Periodic Report of the United States to the U.N.
Committee Against Torture, submitted on May 6, 2005, provides that the
"more likely than not" standard is the standard applied by the government in
cases involving refoulement,5 7 but states that the "United States is unequivocally opposed to the use and practice of torture," and repeatedly underscores the U.S. commitment to abiding by its obligations under Article
3.58 The Committee on Torture itself has stated that "substantial grounds"
requires more than "mere theory or suspicion" but need not meet the test of
"highly probable." 59 Finally, all treaties must be interpreted in accordance
with their "object and purpose, 60 and an "understanding" that was inconsistent with that object and purpose would presumably be tantamount to an
illegal reservation to the treaty in question. 6 1 Were an "actual knowledge"
standard to be read into the CAT, it would contravene the plain language of

UKHL 41, [2000] 1 A.C. 61 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §702 cmt. n (1987); THE PRINCETON
PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 2 (2001), available at http://www.princeton.edu/-la

pa/univejur.pdf.
56 U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings to the Convention Against Torture
and other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 136 Cong. Rec.
36, 194 (1990).
57 Second U.S. Torture Report, supranote 52, at 27.
58

Id. at

2, 27.

U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Report of the Committee Against Torture, Annex IX,
U.N. Doc. A/53/44 (Sept. 16, 1998) (providing communications concerning the return of a
person to a State where there may be grounds he would be subjected to torture), available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/cat/generalcomments/CATCIXXMisc 1_1997.html.
60 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 3, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter VCLOT].
61 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28), availableat http://www.icj-cij.org/icj
www/idecisions.htm.
59
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the treaty and undermine its broad, humanitarian purpose to 62"make more
effective the struggle against torture.. throughout the world.,
Various provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), to which the United States is also a party, apply as
well. If the person is lawfully within the territory of the rendering State,
expulsion requires due process; 63 meanwhile the individual may choose his
or her residence within the territory. 64 Furthermore, an extraordinary (extralegal) rendition frustrates the requirements of the ICCPR that anyone (not
just those lawfully present) who is arrested or detained should have a right
to challenge the validity of his or her detention.6 5 Article 7 of the ICCPR
prohibits torture, as well as cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and the
Human Rights Committee has interpreted the ICCPR's prohibition on torture to include the nonrefoulement obligation. In the Committee's words:
[T]he article 2 obligation requiring that States Parties respect and ensure
the Covenant rights for all persons in their territory and all persons under
their control entails an obligation not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory, where there are substantial
grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as.
. .[torture], either in the country to which removal is to be effected
or in
66
any country to which the person may subsequently be removed.
Finally, the seizure and rendition of suspects may be characterized
as a "forced disappearance" under international human rights law, by which
an individual is abducted by persons acting on behalf of or with the acquiescence of the State, followed by a denial (or obfuscation) of information or
other forms of accountability by State authorities.67 Although the text of the
ICCPR does not specifically prohibit forced disappearances, the Human
Rights Committee and the Inter-American Court have condemned disappearances as violations of Articles 7, 9 and 10(1) of the ICCPR,6 8 as well as
Articles 4, 5,and 7 of the American Convention, 69 and the Rome Statute for
62
CAT, supra note 50, pmbl. Cf Rudolf Bernhardt, Thoughts on the Interpretation of
Human Rights Treaties, in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION: STUDIES
INHONOR OF GERARD J. WIARDA 67-71 (Franz Matscher & Herbert Petzold eds., 1988).
63 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 13, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
64 Id.art. 12.

65

Id.art. 9.

66

Human Rights Comm., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [CCPR],

General Comment No. 31 [80] Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States
Partiesto the Covenant, 12, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.I/Add.13 (Mar. 29, 2004).
67

Louis HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 505 (1999).

68

See Bleier v. Uruguay, Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N. Doc. A/37/40 at 130 (1982); Mojica v.

Dominican Republic, Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/449/1991 (1994).
69 Veldsquez Rodriguez Case, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4 (July 29, 1988).
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the International Criminal Court identifies them as crimes against humanity.70 As the Inter-American Court emphasized in Velasquez Rodriguez,
"those who are disappeared are often subjected to merciless treatment, including all types of indignities, torture and other cruel, inhuman and degradTo the extent the practice of extraordinary rendition
ing treatment ... . ,,71
results in the violation of the human rights provisos referred to above, and
represents official U.S. policy, it violates international law, and the State
Responsibility of the U.S. government is engaged.7 2
In some cases, a U.S. rendition operation begins in the territory of a
State other than the United States. Some extraterritorial U.S. renditions take
place with the consent of the foreign government upon whose territory the
"seizure" of the suspect occurs, often creating an embarrassing political
situation for the "host" country if the rendition operation subsequently
becomes public.7 3 Others are apparently not consented to (at least
publicly)-as in the widely publicized recent case in which Italy has filed
criminal charges against thirteen CIA agents for spiriting a suspect out of
Italy to Egypt without the approval of the Italian government.7 4 Conducting
police operations in the territory of another State without its approval is, as
the Permanent Court of International Justice noted in The Case of the S.S.
"Lotus,,,75
a very basic violation of sovereign rights. In the classic rendition
case, the snatching of Adolf Eichmann out of Argentina for trial in Israel, it
was acknowledged that Argentina's rights as a State had been violated,7 6
70 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Final Act of the U.N. Diplomatic

Conference of Plenipotentiarieson the Establishment of an International Criminal Court,
art. 7(1)(i), U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 183/9 (July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. The Statute
defines enforced disappearance as "the arrest, detention or abduction of persons by, or with
the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization, followed by
a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or
whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time." Id. art. 7(2)(i).
71 Veldsquez Rodriguez, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. at 1156. Although the United States has
not ratified the American Convention, it is a member of the Organization of American States.
72 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702
(1987).
73 The CIA's "Black Sites": Guantanamos in Europe?, SPIEGEL ONLINE, Nov. 7, 2005,
http://service.spiegel.de/cache/international/0, 1518,383670,00.html.
74 Charles M. Sennott, Italy Seethes at U.S. Abduction of Imam. Effort Highlights Chance
for Discord on Terror Suspects, BOSTON GLOBE, July 3, 2005, available at http://www.
boton.com/news/world/europe/articles/2005/07/03/italy_seethes-at us-abduction-of imam/.
75 The Case of the S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7),
availableat http://www.worldcourts.compcij/eng/decisions/1 927.09.07_lotus/.
76 The Security Council condemned the abduction, and Israel apologized to Argentina.
The Council adopted a resolution condemning the kidnapping by a vote of 8 to 0, with two
1abstentions, and one member-Argentina-not participating in the vote. S.C. Res. 138,
3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/138 (June 23, 1960). Nonetheless, Eichmann stood trial for his crimes.
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although Eichmann derived no benefit from that at his trial. 7 In an
extraordinarily narrow interpretation of the U.S.-Mexican extradition treaty,
the U.S. Supreme Court in Alvarez Machain78 arrived at a parallel resultfinding that under the principle of mala captus, bene detentus the defendant
could be tried in the United States although international law was most
certainly violated as regards Mexico. A different interpreter might reach a
different result,7 9 and indeed the opinion generated great consternation
internationally and placed considerable strain on U.S.-Mexican relations. As
Abraham Sofaer, former Legal Advisor to the U.S. Department of State
explained some years earlier in his testimony before the U.S. Congress,
"[t]he United States has repeatedly associated itself with the view that
80
unconsented arrests violate the principle of territorial integrity."
Extraordinary rendition raises perhaps even more troubling concerns than
interstate abduction cases such as Eichmann, for not only are there no clear
legal procedures used regarding the person's seizure and detention, but there
is generally little or no opportunity to challenge either the legality of the
detention and rendition, or the substance of the charges against the detainee
in a subsequent judicial proceeding. Many are held for long periods without
trial; some simply disappear.
IV. TRANSFERS OF PERSONS FROM OCCUPIED IRAQ

As noted earlier, there is no real dispute that U.S. (and U.K.) Coalition Forces in Iraq were subject to international humanitarian law at the
time of their invasion of that country. Indeed, the occupying powers never
disputed this, and Security Council Resolution 1483 called upon all States

In 1985, the U.N. Security Council recognized that "abductions are offenses of grave concern
to the international community" and condemned them "unequivocally." S.C. Res. 579, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/579 (Dec. 18, 1985).
77 CA 336/61 Eichmann v. Attorney General [1962] IsrSC 16(3) 2033, reprintedin
36
I.L.R. 277 (1968).
78 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 669 (1992) (holding that the
U.S.
courts had jurisdiction to try an individual forcibly abducted from Mexico without its consent).
79 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 96 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd 542
U.S. 692 (2004).
80 InternationalLaw and Foreign Policy Implications of Nonconsensual Extraterritorial
Law Enforcement Activities: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 22-23 (1989) (statement of Abraham D.
Sofaer, the Legal Adviser, U.S. Dept. of State). Judge Sofaer went on to suggest that an
exception arose in the case in which Article 51 of the U.N. Charter was invoked regarding
the inherent right of self-defense, including "the right to rescue American citizens and to take
action in a foreign State where that State is providing direct assistance to terrorists, or is
unwilling or unable to prevent terrorists from continuing attacks upon U.S. citizens." Id.
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to observe their obligations under the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 81 As
General Taguba noted in his report on conditions at Abu Ghraib prison, all
prisoners of war and civilian internees held at the prison should receive the
"full protection of the Geneva Conventions, unless the denial of these protections is due to specifically articulated military necessity (e.g., no visitation to preclude the direction of insurgency operations). 8 2 Thus either GC
IV (Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War) or GC III
(Relative to Prisoners of War) apply to Iraqis held by U.S. forces in occupied Iraq, depending upon their status. Civilian detainees, who apparently
comprised as much as 70 to 90 percent of all those arrested in Iraq according to the ICRC,83 are protected from rendition or transfer outside of Iraq by
Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which provides:
Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected
persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or
to that of any84other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of
their motive.

The ICRC Commentary to Article 49 states that "[t]he prohibition is absolute and allows of no exceptions, apart from those stipulated in paragraph 2"
of Article 49,85 which permits the evacuation of an "area if the security of
the population or imperative military reasons so demand. 8 6
On March 19, 2004, a draft opinion by the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") 87 was issued by now Harvard Law
"1 S.C. Res. 1483,

5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003).

supra note 30 (summarizing report of Major General Ryder).

82

TAGUBA REPORT,

83

REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS

(ICRC)

ON THE

TREATMENT BY THE COALITION FORCES OF PRISONERS OF OTHER PROTECTED PERSONS BY THE

GENEVA CONVENTIONS IN IRAQ DURING ARREST, INTERNMENT AND INTERROGATION T 1 (Feb.

2004), reprintedin TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 9, at 383 [hereinafter ICRC February Report].
84 GC IV, supra note 5, art. 49.
85 ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 5.
86 GC IV, supra note 5, art. 49(2). See also ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 5, at 280
(discussing evacuation as an exception). Other "exceptions" to the prohibition are the requirement that the individuals be "protected persons" within the meaning of the Geneva
Conventions, and that Iraq be "occupied," also within the meaning of the GC IV and customary international law. As the government has neither asserted that the individuals sought to
be removed from Iraq were not protected, nor that the U.S. was not the occupying power,
neither of the additional grounds for avoiding the application of Article 49 applies, and will
not be further discussed here. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 5.
87 Memorandum from Jack Goldsmith, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, to William H. Taft, IV, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of State, et al.,
Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Permissibility of Relocating Certain "Protected Persons" from Occupied Iraq (Mar. 19, 2004), reprintedin TORTURE
PAPERS, supra note 9, at 366 [hereinafter OLC Memorandum].
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88
School professor, Jack Goldsmith, III, apparently at the CIA's request,
suggesting that Article 49 permits the deportation and transfer of both aliens
and Iraqis out of the occupied zone. The OLC memorandum concludes that
"[T]he United States may, consistent with Article 49, (1) remove "protected persons" who are illegal aliens from Iraq pursuant to local immigration law; and (2) relocate "protected persons" (whether illegal aliens or
not) from Iraq to another country to facilitate interrogation, for a brief but
long as adjudicative proceedings have not been
not indefinite period, so
89
initiated against them."

The CIA's request for advice, and the memorandum prepared on that basis,
is bewildering, given the sharp criticism by the ICRC and General Taguba
of the CIA's practice of not reporting "ghost detainees" to the ICRC as required by the Fourth Geneva Convention. In the words of General Taguba,
"lt]his maneuver was deceptive, contrary to Army Doctrine, and in violation
of international law." 90 Surely secret renditions to prisons outside of Iraq
are equally problematic. These individuals would presumably be shielded
from regular ICRC visits as well, in violation of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions, and customary international law. 9 1 Moreover, OLC issued its memorandum at a time when ongoing abuses at Abu Ghraib were
known to the U.S. government, even if they were not yet fully revealed to
the public at large.92 Finally, OLC's willingness to endorse the practice of
renditions from Occupied Iraq was particularly risky, given that the violation of this provision is one of the most serious offenses that can be perpetrated under the Geneva Conventions, and is condemned in Article 147 as a
"grave breach," which must be suppressed and punished.9 3 Although the

88

Although the OLC Memorandum has "Draft" stamped on it, it was taken as a "green

light" for transferring protected persons out of occupied Iraq, according to intelligence officials, and has thus apparently guided and informed U.S. policy in Iraq. Dana Priest, Memo
Lets CIA Take Detainees Out ofIraq, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2004, at Al.
89 OLC Memorandum, supra note 87, at 368-69.
TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 30.
91 GC III, supra note 5, art. 126 (providing that the ICRC has full liberty to select the
places it wishes to visit and must be able to interview the detainees without witnesses. The
only exception is that a State may refuse visits for reasons of imperative military necessity as
an "exceptional and temporary measure."). See also GC IV, supra note 5, arts. 76, 143.
92 See Leila Nadya Sadat, InternationalLegal Issues Surrounding the Mistreatment of
Iraqi Detainees by American Forces, ASIL INSIGHT, May, 2004, http://www.asil.org/insights
/insighl34.htm (noting that the Taguba Report was issued on February 26, 2004 but was not
made public until after 60 Minutes aired photos of U.S. soldiers abusing Iraqi prisoners).
93 GC IV, supra note 5, art. 147. Renditions also violate the Convention's prohibition on
unlawful confinement. Indeed, the detention and rendition for purposes of interrogation of
individuals from Occupied Iraq, and particularly Iraqis, constitutes a violation of Article
8(2)(a)(vii) of the Rome Statute's provisions on unlawful deportation or transfer and unlaw90
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final footnote of the OLC memorandum notes that "violations of Article 49
may constitute '[g]rave breaches"' and even a war crime under federal
criminal law, and recommends "case-by-case" evaluation of potential relo94
cations of "protected persons" from Iraq under the guidance of OLC itself,
surely that information would best have been communicated right up front,
rather than buried in a footnote at the end of the document.
This essay analyzes the arguments on these issues, first in terms of
the justifications offered by OLC to support the practice of rendition from
occupied Iraq, and second in terms of the background of the Fourth
Convention and its purposes. Although the OLC memorandum was
apparently not included in later Bush administration legal opinions
justifying rendition from Occupied Iraq, it has been reported that it was
relied upon in the case of at least a dozen prisoners who were transferred
out of Iraq during the U.S. occupation of that country. 95 Moreover, the OLC
memorandum is similar in tone and content to many of the other
memoranda used in support of GWOT detention, interrogation and
treatment policies, making an exegesis of the text and legal analysis it
contains important for systemic reasons, as well as particular applications.
Indeed, a careful analysis of the text suggests that the OLC memorandum is
deficient in three major respects: its approach to the text and spirit of the
Fourth Geneva Convention itself; its highly selective approach to the
applicable legal authorities combined with reliance upon inapposite legal
authority and appeals to "common sense; - 96 and its misapprehension of the
historical context that gave rise to the prohibition embodied in Article 49.
This, in turn, raises some troubling issues regarding the proper role of
government lawyers in giving advice, particularly as regards conduct that
may have far-reaching policy, and even criminal, consequences.
A.

Taking Text Seriously

The OLC memorandum does not directly dispute the ICRC's position-it ignores it. In support of its assertion that "illegal aliens" are not
protected by the prohibition contained in Article 49, the memorandum employs a "de novo" approach to the language of Article 49, focusing upon the
use of the term "deport" and bypassing the fact that the relevant phrase uses
the term "forcible transfer" in a way that clearly indicates that it is broader

ful confinement. See Rome Statute, supra note 70, arts. 7, 8. See also GC IV, supra note 5,
arts. 27, 42, 78.
94 OLC Memorandum, supra note 87, at 379 n. 14.
95 Jehl, supra note 32.
96
OLC Memorandum, supranote 87, at 372.
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than the idea of "deportation" which is included within it.9 7 The memorandum develops an argument based upon a non-common sense understanding
of the word "deport" as applying only to the movement of citizens away
from their homes. This, OLC argues, is justified by reference to a Roman
law understanding of the word which, the argument goes, has been embodied in customary international law. Thus, the OLC memorandum concludes
that the "deportation" of non-citizens who are illegal aliens is permitted by
Article 49.98 As explained below, the memorandum supports this conclusion by referring to crimes against humanity cases that have little or nothing
to do with Article 49.99
As noted earlier, 1°° it is hornbook (international) law that a treaty is
"interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object
and purpose." 1 °1 One looks to subsidiary means of interpretation only if the
ordinary meaning is either "ambiguous or obscure,"'' 0 2 or "leads to a result
° which is not the case here.
which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable," 103
In the case of Article 49, the "ordinary meaning" of the term "deport" in
English, particularly in conjunction with the term transfers, plainly appears
to cover all protected persons, citizens and non-citizens alike, as the ICRC
Commentary suggests. In the United States, we do not use the term "deport"
in connection with "transfers" of our citizens because U.S. citizens cannot
constitutionally be "deported" abroad. 0 4 In U.S. practice, "deportation"
always refers to aliens, as OLC admits, so there is little support for the assertion that the word excludes illegal aliens as a matter of either plain language or common sense. Certainly, one could try to make an argument
based upon the French text of the Fourth Convention, which refers to the

97 This identical approach was probably borrowed from one of the authorities cited by
Goldsmith, Judge Schomburg's separate opinion in Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-971-17 (Sept. 17, 2003), paragraph 15 of which is cited by the OLC Memo25-A, Judgment,
randum. OLC Memorandum, supra note 87, at 371. However, as we shall see infra, citing
crimes against humanity cases to determine the meaning of Article 49 of GC V is unhelpful,
and even misleading.
98 Goldsmith suggests that Roman law supports this view. OLC Memorandum, supra note
87, at 368.
99 Although one can find French writers using the term d~porter in connection with nonFrench persons, the usage seems general, and operations that we call "deportations" are
typically (but not always) referred to as expulsions in French. See infra note 105 and
accompanying text.
100 See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
'01 VCLOT, supranote 60, art. 3 1(1).
102 Id. art. 32(a).
103 Id, art. 32(b).
104 See supra notes 3842 and accompanying text.
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"dportations de personnes protegees,'' 10 5 because sometimes the French
employ the term expulsion rather than dtportationregarding aliens removed
from the territory pursuant to immigration laws, 10 6 and sometimes use the
notion of d~portation to mean "banishment" (of citizens) in the Roman law
sense. 10 7 This might provide some support for OLC's conclusions that the
word "deportation" or "d~portation" in Article 49 excludes aliens from its
purview, particularly given the influence of Roman law on the French legal
system. Yet neither a linguistic nor a Roman law analysis helps much in this
regard. To begin with, in France the term dtportation in international humanitarian law is not used in an immigration law sense, but as a term of art,
meaning the "forced transfer of individuals or groups of civilians (protected
persons) outside of occupied territory,"' 1 8 without mentioning citizenship.
Harrap's New StandardDictionary refers to diportation as the "deportation
(of undesirable alien, etc.)"' 0 9 and Cornu's VocabulaireJuridique defines it
as permanent exile from the territory of continental France, making no mention of the nationality of the individual thus banished." 0 This suggests that
the English and French meanings of the term deportation or dLportation are
the same, at least as they are used in the Geneva conventions.'1 Thus, an
exegesis of the French text provides little support for OLC's position.
At best, if there were a terminological difficulty, this potential linguistic conflict should be examined through the lens of Article 150 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention, 1 2 which renders the French and the English
texts of the Geneva Conventions "equally authentic," and suggests no rationale for preferring one to the other. Moreover, the Vienna Convention on
105

Convention de Gen~ve relative a la protection des personnes civiles en temps de guerre
art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, available at http://www. icrc.org/
dih.nsf/FULL/380?OpenDocument.
106 VOCABULAIRE JURIDIQUE 340 (Gdrard Cornu ed., 2d ed. 1990).
107 This is the argument made by the Memorandum based on a citation in Black's Law
Dictionary noting the Roman law meaning of "deportation" as "banishment." OLC Memorandum, supra note 87, at 368 n.3. Curiously, the Memorandum relies upon an old Fourth
Edition (1951) of Black's Law Dictionary, perhaps because the most recent edition, published in 2004, would seem to directly refute the Memorandum's argument. The latest edition of Black's has two separate entries on this question. The first, for "deportatio," refers to
the Roman law punishment of permanent exile for citizens. The second, for "deportation,"
refers to the expulsion or transfer of an alien. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 471 (8th ed. 2004).
108

JEAN SALMON, DICTIONNAIRE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC

109

1 HARRAP'S STANDARD FRENCH AND ENGLISH DICTIONARY

1966).
110 See VOCABULAIRE

JURIDIQUE,

323-24 (200 1).
251 (J.E. Mansion ed.,

supra note 106, at 259 ("[A] demeurer A perprtuit6 dans

un lieu drtermind par la loi, hors du territoire continental de France.).
"'1
See also infra notes 142-44 (discussing Judge Schomburg's analysis of the term in the
ICTY Statute).
112 GC IV, supra note 5, art. 150; Convention de Gen~ve relative A la protection des
personnes civiles en temps de guerre, supra note 105, art. 150.
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the Law of Treaties provides that in the case of multilingual texts "the
meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and
purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted."' 1 3 Such a reconciliation suggests,
as does the ICRC Commentary, that the term "deport" in Article 49 covers
both citizens and non-citizens alike.
The OCL memorandum's Roman law argument is intriguing, although similarly unpersuasive. According to A Dictionary of Greek and
Roman Antiquities, deportatio was a species of exsilium, whereby an individual was banished and lost certain elements of his citizenship--"if he was
a father, his children ceased to be in his power; and if he was a son, he
The punishment of deportatio
ceased to be in his father's power ...
was inflicted only on persons "of consideration," that is, the upper classes,
and only for serious crimes, such as perversion of religion, for example,
adopting Christianity or Judaism." 5 The banishment imposed was generally
to either an island or oasis." 16 Because the Geneva conventions were negotiated in the immediate aftermath of World War II during which there had
been mass forcible displacements of both citizens and refugees, as explained
in greater detail below, it is difficult to see how these Roman law conceptions would be relevant in any way to a contemporary understanding of Article 49.
Additionally, Article 49 refers to "transfers, as well as
deportations."' " 7 The OLC memorandum is particularly inadequate as it
leaps to the conclusion that its restrictive interpretation of the term "deport"
also constricts the application of the term "transfer."' 18 The term transfer
appears at various places in the Fourth Geneva Convention in ways that
indicate it is to be interpreted broadly. For example, Article 106 requires the
issuance of a new internment card in case of "transfer to another place of
',1"9
Humanitarian conventions should be
internment or to a hospital .
interpreted to promote their purpose: to protect individuals. 20 The better
VCLOT, supra note 60, art. 33(4).
Anthony Rich, Exsilium, in A DICTIONARY OF GREEK AND ROMAN ANTIQUITIES 515-517
(William Smith ed., 1875), availableat http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts
/secondary/SMIGRA*/Exsilium.html.
113

114

... PATRICK MAC CHOMBAICH DE COLQUHOUN, 3 A SUMMARY OF THE ROMAN CiviL LAW §
2400 (1854); GEORGE MOuSOuRAKIS, THE HISTORICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF
ROMAN LAW 314 (2003).
116 MOUSOURAKIS, supra note 115, at 314.

117

GC IV, supra note 5, art. 49(1) (emphasis added).
See OLC Memorandum, supra note 87, at 371-72.
119 GC IV, supra note 5, art. 106; see also id. art. 128 (giving notice of transfer to internees); see also id. art. 45 (no transfer to a Power not a party to the Convention).
120 Another part of the text argues against the exclusion of categories of persons: "Persons
protected by the Convention are those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves ... in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which
118
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reading of the text, therefore, would not deny protection to those who find
themselves in occupied territory without the mantle of citizenship, and
indeed, some authorities simply apply the term "inhabitants" to those
21
individuals benefiting from international humanitarian law protections.
This reading of the text was explicitly confirmed in the adoption of the
Elements of Crimes for the Rome Statute for the International Criminal
Court, whereby the drafters explicitly rejected Goldsmith's proposed new
understanding of Article 49:
The Preparatory Commission felt that the suggested requirement that a
protected person must be transferred from his or her "lawful place of residence," as is required for the crime against humanity of deportation or
forcible transfer (art. 7(2)(d) of the Statute) is not an element of unlawful
deportationor transfer as defined in the Geneva Conventions.122

Indeed, despite the best efforts at Goldsmith's de novo interpretation of
Article 49, and the citation of many references in the first eight pages of the
OLC Memorandum (none of which directly contradict the plain meaning of
Article 49) the clear understanding that emerges from both a textual and
referential analysis is that both individual and mass deportations and
transfers, of both citizens and non-citizens, are categorically prohibited.
The second conclusion of the OLC memorandum is that it is lawful
to "relocate 'protected persons' ... to another country to facilitate interrogation." 123 This presumably refers to both Iraqis and non-Iraqis, although
OLC concludes that only those not yet accused of an offense could be subject to rendition. 124 Once again, the argument relies upon linguistic ploys
directly contradicted by the text of the Fourth Geneva Convention itself, and
there is an aura of subterfuge about the intended purpose. How can the
transfer "facilitate interrogation" except by removing protected individuals
from the watchful eye of the ICRC? As aforementioned, the Fourth Geneva
Convention requires that the ICRC be notified of all transfers, including

they are not nationals." GC IV, supra note 5, art. 4. That breadth is emphasized by an explicit
exclusion: for citizens of a neutral state which has normal diplomatic representation with the
Occupier.
121 The OLC memorandum admits as much, but argues that "nothing in the historical record suggests that this term was intended or understood to include illegal aliens .... " OLC
Memorandum, supra note 87, at 369.
122 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE
AND EVIDENCE
CRIMES].
123 OLC
124

137 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001) (emphasis added) [hereinafter

Memorandum, supra note 87, at 368.

Id. at 374-75 (citing GC IV, supra note 5, art. 76(1)).
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ones within the occupied territory or temporary ones.1 25 The memorandum
notably does not remind the CIA of that obligation.
B. Customary InternationalLaw andState Practice
Given that neither a textual nor linguistic analysis supports OLC's
conclusions regarding the meaning of Article 49, what of customary international law? Again, there is virtually no support in either State or international practice to support OLC's de novo interpretation of Article 49, and
indeed, the memorandum points to no authorities supporting its proposed
reading of that provision, relying instead upon selective and inapposite
sources. In fact, a review of the ICRC's recently published authoritative
summary of State practice regarding deportations and transfers supports the
notion that the prohibition in Article 49 is absolute.' 26 The only arguable
exception appears to be the jurisprudence of Israel's High Court, which
most recently in Affo v. IDF Commander (West Bank),127 adopted a nonliteral reading of Article 49. The Court in Affo, confirming its earlier jurisprudence,1 2 8 held that Article 49 does not apply to "removal from the territory of a terrorist, infiltrator or enemy agent," which allowed the Israeli
authorities to undertake the deportation of lawfully present Palestinians
from the Occupied Territories if they had taken part in activities hostile to

125 See GC TTI,supra note 5, art. 126; see GC IV, supra note 5, arts. 76(6), 143. See also
INTERNATIONAL

COMMITTEE

OF

THE

RED

CROSS,

2

CUSTOMARY

INTERNATIONAL

HUMANITARIAN LAW 2824-41 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005)
(describing legal instruments and practice of ICRC access to persons deprived of their liberty).
126
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 125, at 2913-33 (citing
military manuals, national legislation, national case law, national practices of numerous
States and international organizations and conferences that have adopted Article 49's prohibitions on deportations and transfers).
127 HCJ 785/87 Affo v. Commander Israel Defence Force in the West Bank [1988] IsrSC
42(2), reprinted in 83 I.L.R. 122 (1990). Goldsmith cites the Affo case following a "cf."
signal, but does not properly distinguish or explain it. OLC Memorandum, supra note 87, at
372-73. Affo makes the argument that the prohibition against transfers and deportations applies, under customary international law, only to mass deportations, such as those carried out
by Hitler, and not to individual transfers, such as those carried out by Israel in the occupied
territories. Affo, 83 I.L.R. 122. However, what Goldsmith does not say is that Affo does not
speak to the issue of transfers of aliens at all.
128 See, e.g., Justus R. Weiner, Israel'sExpulsion of Islamic Militants to Southern Lebanon,
26 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 357, 361 n.17 (1995) (citing HCJ 97/79 Abu Awad v. Regional Commander of Judea and Samaria [1979] IsrSC 33(3); HCJ 320/80 Kawasma v. Minister of Defence [1981] IsrSC 35(3); HCJ 513/85 Nazal v. Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
Commander of Judea and Samaria [1985] IsrSC 39(3)). These deportations, unlike U.S.
extraordinary renditions, are public, not covert, and the individuals concerned generally have
the opportunity to challenge their deportation in a court of law.
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Israeli authorities.12 9 Affo does not support OLC's specific position on Article 49's inapplicability to illegal aliens, of course, given that it carved out an
exception to Article 49 for Palestinian individuals who were otherwise lawfully present. Nonetheless, if Affo was accepted internationally, it could indicate some support for carving out similar exceptions in other cases. Affo
has not, however, been either followed by other States or accepted internationally, and Israeli deportations of Palestinian citizens have been vocifer130
ously criticized by the United Nations, including the Security Council.
Moreover, even within Israel, Affo's holding is controversial; indeed, the
majority opinion was issued over a vigorous dissent by Justice Bach, who
found the language of Article 49 to be "unequivocal and explicit" 131 and
emphasized that distinguished Israeli scholars did not share the Court's
view of Article 49.132
As to international practice, what little there has been does not support OLC's sweeping assertions. Particularly unfortunate is the memorandum's reliance on two opinions cited from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and Article 7(2)(d) of the Rome Statute for
the International Criminal Court. 13 3 The OLC memorandum is correct in
stating that deportations and forcible transfers may constitute crimes against
humanity as well as war crimes, depending upon the circumstances. Where
it errs, however, is in assuming that the definitions of the two crimes are
identical. Because crimes against humanity may be committed in peacetime
129

Affo, 83 I.L.R. at 140. For a similar view see Emanuel Gross, Defensive Democracy: Is

It Possible to Revoke the Citizenship, Deport,or Negate the Civil Rights ofa PersonInstigating TerroristAction Against His Own State?, 72 UMKC L. REv. 51, 88 (2003).
130 S.C. Res. 607, U.N. Doc S/RES/607 (Jan. 5, 1988) (deploring Israel's decision to continue deporting civilians).
131 Id.at 188 (Bach, J., dissenting).
132 Id. at 191-92 (Bach, J., dissenting) (citing Yoram Dinstein, Settlements and Deporta-

tions in the Occupied Territories, in 7

IYUNEI MISHPAT 188 (1979-80)); YORAM DINSTEIN,
THE LAWS OF WAR 225 (1983); Yoram Dinstein, The InternationalLaw of Belligerent Occupation and Human Rights, 1 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 104, 123 (1978). Dinstein
vigorously critiques the Israeli jurisprudence in a later article, Dinstein, Deportations,supra
note 42, but does indirectly lend some support to OLC's thesis by arguing, in passing, that
perhaps "infiltrators" could be excluded from occupied territories, even if Article 49 forbade
their deportation. Id.at 18. The Israeli position has been rejected by several General Assembly Resolutions, and in resolutions adopted in 1988 and 1989 the U.N. Sub-Commission on
Human Rights considered that the expulsion and deportation of civilians from their homeland
by force was a war crime under international law. Behnam Dayanim, The Israeli Supreme
Court and the Deportations of Palestinians: The Interaction of Law and Legitimacy, 30
STAN. J. INT'L L. 115 (1994).
133 OLC Memorandum, supra note 87, at 371 (citing Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-

97-25, Appeals Chamber Judgment, Separate Opinion of Judge Schomburg, 15 (Sept. 17,
2003) and Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Trial Chamber Judgment, 234 (Mar.
3, 2000) for the actus reus standard of forcible deportation; citing Rome Statute, supra note
70, art. 7(2)(d), which defines "deportation or forcible transfer of population").
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as well as war time, and most or all States carry out legitimate acts of deportation on a frequent basis, the "unlawful" element of deportation as a crime
against humanity was thought necessary so as not to criminalize perfectly
lawful State activities. Thus, although the Rome Statute's definition of
forcible transfer and deportation as a crime against humanity (Article 7 of
the Statute) includes the notion that the individuals must be "lawfully present," 134 the "lawful presence" requirement is specifically excluded from the
war crimes element of deportation and forcible transfer (Article 8 of the
Statute). Curiously, Goldsmith makes no reference whatsoever to Article 8
(war crimes) of the Rome Statute, which would be the relevant provision in
the instant case. 35 Instead, he refers to two paragraphs from two ICTY
opinions, Prosecutor v. Krnojelac (citing paragraph 15 of Judge Schomburg's separate opinion) 136 and Prosecutorv. Blaskic (citing paragraph 234
of the opinion). 137 Yet these opinions do not bear on the subject at hand.
In Krnojelac, the defendant, Milorad Krnojelac, was charged with
forced labour, deportation and expulsion as the crime against humanity of
persecution under Article 5(h) of the ICTY Statute. 138 He was the warden of
a large prison complex situated in the town of Foca, in the Eastern part of
Bosnia, where a large number of non-Serbian men were detained for long
periods of time during the war. The Prosecution alleged that the accused had
assisted in the deportation and expulsion of Muslim and non-Serbian men
from the Foca region, by transferring them from the prison to other facilities
or to Montenegro where they were told they would be exchanged for other
prisoners, although none were ever seen alive again.' 39 Trial Chamber II
acquitted Krnojelac of this count of the indictment, finding that it was not
clear that the individuals transferred from the prison had crossed a national
border, or, even if they had, had been forced to do so. The Appeals Cham13' ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 122, at 86-87. Interestingly, the Drafters left open the
question whether national or international law should be referred to in determine the notion
of "lawful presence." Id. at 87.
135 Rome Statute, supra note 70, art. 8(2)(a)(vii) (making "unlawful deportation or transfer
or unlawful confinement" a war crime and noting that these are grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions). The element of this offense provides that the person must have "deported or
transferred one or more persons to another State or to another location" and that "Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949." Id
136 OLC Memorandum, supra note 87, at 371 (citing Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT97-25, Appeals Chamber Judgment, Separate Opinion of Judge Schomburg, 15 (Sept. 17,
2003)).
137 Id. (citing Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Trial Chamber Judgment, 1 234
(Mar. 3, 2000)).
138 Statute of the International Tribunal art. 5(h), May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192; Prosecutor
v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-I, Third Amended Indictment, 5.2 (June 25, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/krn-3aiO10625e.htm.
139 Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-I, Third Amended Indictment.
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ber reversed, finding that at the time of the Yugoslav conflict, forcible displacements within a State and across a national border violated customary
international law,140 and, "if committed with the requisite discriminatory
intent, constitute[d]" the crime against humanity of persecution. 141 Refusing
to reach the issue whether the crossing of a national border was an element
of the offense, or not, the majority held only that such acts of forcible displacement could constitute the crime of persecution (Article 5(h) of the
Statute), noting that Article 5(d), the crime of deportation, had not been
specifically charged, and, therefore need not be addressed. 142 Concurring,
but writing separately, Judge Schomburg thought the majority should have
reached the issue whether acts of "deportation" required the traversing of a
national border, and, construing the Statute broadly, in light of the humanitarian purposes of the drafters, determined that "a fixed destination" was not
necessary for the crime to occur; what was essential was the forcible displacement of the victims, whether across a national border, or not.143 Interestingly, he observed that the French text of the ICTY Statute improperly
translated deportation as expulsion' 44 and expressly declined to address the
question whether the meaning of the term deportation in Article 5 of the
ICTY Statute (crimes against humanity) and the Geneva Conventions was
the same. 145 This determination of deportation as a crime against humanity
of persecution has little or nothing to add to the interpretation of Article 49
of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
Like Krnojelac, Prosecutorv. Blaskic does not address the question
OLC's memorandum is directed to, namely the meaning of deportation as a
war crime pursuant to Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Rather,
it too relates to the inclusion of "deportation, forcible transfer, and forcible
displacement"' 146 as a possible actus reus for the crime against humanity of
persecution under Article 5(h) of the ICTY Statute. For that reason, particularly given the paucity of discussion on the question in the case, it is of little
value in interpreting Article 49.

140

Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment,

223

(Sept. 17, 2003).
141

Id. 222.

142 See id. 224.
143 Id.Separate Opinion of Judge Schomburg,
144 Id. I l1l.
145 Id.

15.

14.
146 Prosecutor v. Blaskie, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 152 (July
29, 2004). The OLC memorandum actually cites to the Trial Chamber judgment, rather than
the Appeals Chamber judgment, although neither is particularly on point. OLC Memorandum, supra note 87, at 371.
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C. The Evocation of Common Sense
In an effort to shore up its conclusion that Article 49 permits the
deportation of illegal aliens, OLC argues that if its proposed interpretation
was not accepted, the Fourth Geneva Convention would become "a welcome mat to occupied territory,"'' 47 insinuating (through reference to Affo,
discussed above) that otherwise "a murderer who escaped to the occupied
territory would have a safe haven, which would preclude his transfer to the
authorized jurisdiction." 148 Yet the Fourth Geneva Convention clearly anticipates this precise situation, providing in Article 45 that there is no "obstacle to the extradition ... of protected persons accused of offences against
ordinary criminal law."' 149 Of course, international humanitarian law and
international human rights law contemplate the transfer of a prisoner pursuant to legal processes and humane conditions; neither regime would support
the extralegal transfer of detainees to secret prisons for the purpose of interrogation, particularly if that interrogation was accompanied by the use of
torture or other forms of cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment.
D. HistoricalBackground
It is not surprising that the OLC approach has little or no acceptance
in international law and practice given the historical background against
which the deliberations at Geneva took place in 1949. It must be recalled
that German, particularly Jewish, nationals fled Germany for other parts of
Europe that were subsequently occupied, and many would have been "illegal aliens" (to use Goldsmith's term) in their countries of refuge. 150 For
example, with respect to the Jewish refugee population of France, the classic history of Vichy notes that "the most bestial of the German depredations" was the "massive deportation of foreign refugee Jews from France to
the extermination camps in Poland and eastern Germany. ' ' 5! Indeed, the
most prominent deportees of all, Anne Frank and her family, were Germans
147

OLC Memorandum, supra note 87, at 372.

148

Id. at 373.

GC IV, supra note 5, art. 45.
150 Goldsmith provides many statements about the particular hardships of deporting people
149

from their country of citizenship. OLC Memorandum, supra note 87, at 369-372. This is not
the same as finding that the drafters affirmatively intended to exclude aliens from the protected class.
151 ROBERT O. PAXTON, VICHY FRANCE: OLD GUARD AND NEW ORDER, 1940-1944 311-12
(1972). Paxton estimates that of the 60-65,000 Jews deported from France only 6,000 were
French citizens. Id. at 183. Another category of unlawful aliens were agents of the allies such
as Flight Commander Yeo-Thomas of the Royal Air Force who was captured by the Nazis
after being parachuted into France and was sent to Buchenwald camp in Germany. Wikipedia, F.F.E. Yeo-Thomas, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F.F.E.Yeo-Thomas.
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living in Holland and by the time of their arrest and deportation to Auschwitz probably did not have legal papers. 112 As Anne wrote in her diary, concerning the fate of the Jews of Holland, particularly those who had sought
refuge there:
Countless friends and acquaintances have been taken off to a dreadful fate.
Night after night, green and gray military vehicles cruise the streets. They
knock on every door, asking whether any Jews live there. If so, the whole
family is immediately taken away.... In the evenings when it's dark, I often see long lines of good, innocent people, accompanied by crying children, walking on and on, ordered about by a handful53of men who bully and
beat them until they nearly drop. No one is spared. 1
The images of heartbreaking scenes like these were fresh in the minds of
those who drafted the Geneva Conventions. 154 Indeed, as the OLC memorandum itself notes, the drafters concerned themselves not only with citizens
of occupied territories, but the rights of aliens. Footnote 11 of the OLC
memorandum suggests this, referring to the comments of the Norwegian
delegate about the status of "ex-German Jews" who found themselves in
occupied territories. In fact, Article 70 of the Fourth Geneva Convention
specifically protects from deportation nationals of the occupying power; that
is, Germans, in the context of World War 11.155 Clearly, refugees were a
major target of Nazi deportations, and the inclusion of Article 49 and other
provisions in the 1949 Geneva Conventions was a direct response.
The CIA's rendition plan is in some ways eerily reminiscent of the
Nazi operation called Nacht und Nebel or "Night and Fog," although presumably it pales in comparison to the systematic atrocities perpetrated by
152

ANNE FRANK, THE DIARY OF A YOUNG GIRL: THE DEFINITIVE EDITION

7-8 (Otto H.

Frank & Miram Pressler eds., 1991). I am particularly indebted to Detlev Vagts for bringing
the example of Anne Frank to my attention. As he notes, Anne and her family could not have
gone to the local police to renew their residency permits, and by the time of their capture
were undoubtedly without lawful papers.
'
Id. at 72-73.
154 In the words of the ICRC commentaries, "[t]here is doubtless no need to give an account here of the painful recollections called forth by the 'deportations' of the Second World
War, for they are still present in everyone's memory. It will suffice to mention that millions
of human beings were tom from their homes, separated from their families and deported
from their country, usually under inhumane conditions." ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 5.
15 Article 70(2) provides:
Nationals of the occupying Power who, before the outbreak of hostilities, have
sought refuge in the territory of the occupied State, shall not be arrested, prosecuted, convicted or deported from the occupied territory, except for offences committed after the outbreak of hostilities, or for offences under common law committed before the outbreak of hostilities which, according to the law of the occupied
State, would have justified extradition in time of peace.
GC IV, supra note 5, art. 70(2).
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the Third Reich. The Nacht und Nebel program was established by a directive issued by Hitler on December 7, 1941.156 Pursuant to this policy, individuals were taken from the occupied territories, where they were accused
of resistance activities against German occupying forces, and were then
spirited away for secret trial by special courts in Germany. As the Nuremberg trial record explains, "the [defendant's] whereabouts, trial, and subsequent disposition were kept completely secret ...

[for] the dual purpose of

terrorizing the victim's relatives and associates and barring recourse to evidence, witnesses, or counsel for defense." 157 The proceedings often resulted
in the torture, ill-treatment and death of those captured; those who were
acquitted were nonetheless kept in the "protective custody" of the Gestapo
for the rest of the war. 158 This practice, which was condemned by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, 15 9 was also a major focus of the
American war crimes trial known as the Justice Case, so called because all
the defendants in that case held positions in the Reich system of Justice,
either as officials of the German Ministry of Justice, or as judges or prosecutors of the Extraordinary Courts established under Nazi law. As a result of
that trial, various German lawyers employed by the Ministry of Justice to
handle the Nacht und Nebel Erlass were found guilty of committing offenses against the laws and customs of war and sentenced to terms that
ranged from five years confinement (with credit for time served)60 to life imprisonment for the Minister of Justice himself and his assistant. 1
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U.S. v. Altstoetter, reprintedin 3 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG

MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 1033 (1951).
'5
Id. at 1031.
'5

Id. at 1031-32.

Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences (Oct. 1, 1946),
reprintedin 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 226 (1947).
160 Paragraph 13 of the indictment (war crimes) charged defendants Altstoetter, von Ammon, Engert, Joel, Klemm, Mettgenberg, and Schlegelberger with responsibility for and
participation in crimes committed pursuant to the Nazis' "Night and Fog" program. U.S. v.
Altstoetter, reprintedin 3 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 21 (1951). Altstoetter received the lightest sentence (5 years); he was the Chief of the Civil Law and Procedure Division of the
Reich Ministry of Justice; Klemm (State Secretary in the Reich Ministry of Justice) and
Schlegelberger (State Secretary; Acting Minister of Justice) were sentenced to imprisonment
for life. The other accused (von Ammon, Joel, and Mettgenberg) received sentences of ten
years. A mistrial was declared as to the defendant Engert, whose physical condition prevented his presence in court for most of the trial. U.S. v. Altstoetter, reprintedin 3 TRIALS OF
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL
LAwNO. 10 3 (1951).
159 International Military
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V. CONCLUSION

Acts of international terrorism pose a genuine danger to the safety
and well-being of Americans, and the U.S. government is entitled, indeed
required, to meet that threat. However, just as the Geneva Conventions and
international human rights law did not create the threat, eviscerating those
legal instruments will not eliminate it. Indeed, the provisions of international humanitarian law and international human rights law were formulated, during extensive and painstaking multilateral treaty negotiations, to
meet the needs of governments during war time as well as peace. Moreover,
international human rights instruments specifically permit governments to
derogate from certain of their provisions during times of emergency, as the
United Kingdom did, for example, after September 11, 2001, but which the
U.S. has not done.16 1 The bending of law to suit government aims in the
manner exemplified by the OLC memorandum and the government's extraordinary -rendition policies writ large bodes ill for protection of human
rights and has little62support in either international law or the practice of
"civilized nations."1
The OLC memorandum, like many of the other memoranda issued
to cover GWOT policies, appears as one of a series of administration documents raising three very troubling human rights concerns. First, it departs
from existing and conventional interpretations of the law, both domestic and
international, and instead promotes novel, de novo, and often misleading
legal arguments-without highlighting the radical departure adopting them
represents, or the costs that may be entailed in following the advice they
contain. In this way it is similar to the earlier, and in retrospect fateful,
memoranda penned by Yoo, Delahunty,1 63 and Gonzales, determining that

161

See A v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't, [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 W.L.R. 87

(appeal taken from Eng. (U.K.) 11 (opinion of Lord Bingham of Cornhill).
162 Cf Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(c), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 (detailing what international law and other customs the ICJ shall use
to resolve disputes, including "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations").
163 See Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, & Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, Office of Legal
Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice to William J. Haynes, II, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Def.,
Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 9, 2002), reprinted
in TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 9, at 38. Yoo and Delahunty argued that "neither the Geneva
Conventions nor the [War Crimes Act] regulate the detention of al Qaeda prisoners . . . [or
members of the Taliban militia] captured during the Afghanistan conflict." Id. at 39. They
further contend that "customary international law.., does not bind the President [or the U.S.
military] because it does not constitute federal law ....Id.
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Geneva law would not apply to the GWOT, 164 and the "Torture Memos"
that followed. 165 The theories articulated in these documents have each enhanced Executive Branch authority, often leaving detainees in U.S. custody
with few, if any, opportunities to challenge either the legality of their detention, or the treatment they have received. They provide no opportunity for
any real oversight either by Congress or the courts, particularly as regards
extraordinary rendition, for the renditions are carried out in secret and the
prisoners' situations may never be brought to light. Under these circumstances, law becomes an instrument of oppression, rather than protection,
and fails in its most fundamental purpose to provide the basis for a fair and
free society.
Second, U.S. detention policies generally, and rendition in particular, are problematic because those targeted are overwhelmingly Muslim or
Arab. At a time when relations with the Muslim world appear to be at an
all-time low, 166 this would seem to be an ineffectual strategy for the United
States, and counter to the articulated objectives of U.S. public diplomacy
policies. Certainly it diminishes, rather than enhances, 167U.S. efforts to engage moderate Muslims as allies in its "War on Terror."'
Finally, the volatile combination of prejudice and the enhancement
of Executive authority has been a potent one, leading sadly, but perhaps
unsurprisingly, to a catastrophic failure to protect the basic human rights of
those presently held in U.S. detention facilities, many of whom, and indeed,
at some facilities most of whom appear not to be terroristsuspects at all.
Recall that the catalog of abuses at Abu Ghraib prison included physical
violence, "videotaping and photographing naked male and female detainees;
[f]orcibly arranging detainees in various sexually explicit positions for photographing; [f]orcing detainees to remove their clothing and [remain] naked
for several days at a time; [and] [u]sing military working dogs (without
muzzles) to intimidate and frighten detainees."'' 68 Yet the Red Cross report
164

See Gonzales, Geneva Memo, supra note 11, at 119-20. In fairness to Gonzales, his

memorandum does include a "balance sheet" of positive and negative implications regarding
the decision not to apply Geneva law to the Afghanistan conflict. Id.
165 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. On the ethics of the memos, see, e.g., Kathleen Clark, Torture Memos, Ethics & Accountability, J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y (forthcoming 2006).
166 See How the United States is Perceived in the Arab and Muslim Worlds: Hearing before
the Subcomm. On Oversight and Investigations, 109th Congress (2005) (statement of Andrew Kohut, President, Pew Research Center), available at http://pewglobal.org/reports
commentary/display.php?ReportAnalysislD=1001. The recent furor over the publication of
cartoons in Denmark satirizing the Prophet Muhammad suggests the ease with which tension
can be provoked between the Western and Islamic worlds. See, e.g., Hassan M. Fattah, At
Mecca Meeting, Cartoon Outrage Crystallized,N.Y TIMES, Feb. 9, 2006, at Al.
167 See Sadat, Do All Arabs Really Look Alike?, supra note 46, at 76-78.
168 TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 30.
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states that military intelligence officers estimate that between 70 and 90
percent of the thousands of prisoners held by the U.S. in Iraq may have been
brought there by mistake. 169 Recent releases of prisoners at Guantanamo
Bay also suggests that many of those "high value" prisoners in fact had very
little information to share; or at the very least, were perhaps not so dangerous after all, 170 as does the release of Yasser Hamdi, the accused Taliban
fighter who was held in Guantanamo for nearly three years without
charges. 17 ' There have also been mistakes in those transferred under the
extraordinary rendition program, as amply demonstrated by the situation of
Maher Arar, who was allegedly hung upside-down, subjected to electric
a "grave-like cell."' 172 leaving him "a ruined
shock treatments, and put into
' 73
age."'
of
years
man at just 55
Proponents of these policies no doubt sincerely believe that they are
justified, indeed, necessary to win the GWOT. Yet as I hope this essay has
demonstrated, they are surely not "legal" as that term is customarily understood. Nor do they seem to be particularly effective, suggesting that whatever utilitarian rationale might be proffered in their defense cannot be sustained: According to recent statistics the number of "significant terrorist
attacks" in 2004 was 655, triple the year before, 7 4 and well-seasoned interrogators have questioned the efficacy of torture and cruel treatment in obtaining useful and reliable evidence from prisoners. Moreover, the question
remains, having abandoned the rule of law for some new shadowy "para175
digm," even if we "won," would we recognize what we have become?
The current policies apply primarily to non-citizens, however U.S. citizens
such as Jose Padilla have been ensnared in the legal limbo the government
has established.
The President, the Courts, the Congress and we, as the people of the
United States, must choose how to wage this so-called war: what strategies
169 ICRC February Report, supra note 83, at 8.
170 See Lisa Hajjar, Torture and the Future, MIDDLE EAST REP. ONLINE, May, 2004,
See also Corine Hegland,
http://www.merip.org/mero/interventions/hajjarinterv.html.
Guantanamo's Grip, NAT'L J., Feb. 4, 2006, at 20 (alleging that an examination of the files
of 132 enemy combatants held at Guantanamo Bay shows that most are not accused of engaging in hostilities against the United States).
171 Although a citizen of the U.S., Hamdi was apparently born in Saudi Arabia. He returned
there under the terms of an arrangement worked out with U.S. government attorneys. Transcript of CNN Live at Daybreak, Yasser Hamdi Returns to Native Saudi Arabia, CNN.coM,
Oct. 11, 2004, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0410/1 l/lad.04.html.
172 NY City Bar Report, supra note 2, at 18.
173 Bob Herbert, Our Dirty War, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2006, at 27.
174 Tom Regan, Global TerrorAttacks Tripled in 2004, CHRISTIAN SCi. MONITOR, April 28,
2005, availableat http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0428/dailyUpdate.html.
175 See, e.g., David J. Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REv.
1425 (2005).
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to employ, what tactics to embrace, what means to use. As the world's only
superpower, the United States must also always be cognizant of its tremendous power and ability to influence other nations. Secret prisons, secret
prisoners, indefinite detention and the use of torture and cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment, all in violation of international human rights law and
international humanitarian law should be uniformly and categorically rejected, not embraced, by all citizens of the United States, and particularly by
lawyers, who understand the complexities of the law and its central role in
holding a society together when it is tested by adversity and difficult times.
Other democracies, even those which have directly experienced terrorist
attacks, have rejected the U.S. approach in favor of a more measured and
legalistic path, more carefully balancing the need for extraordinary measures against the deprivations of liberty such an approach might entail. As
Lord Hoffman wrote in the 8-1 House of Lords opinion striking down Britain's indefinite detention of aliens who were suspected of being concerned
in terrorism:
This is a nation which has been tested in adversity, which has survived
physical destruction and catastrophic loss of life. I do not underestimate
the ability of fanatical groups of terrorists to kill and destroy, but they do
not threaten the life of the nation. Whether we would survive Hitler76hung
in the balance, but there is no doubt that we shall survive Al-Qaeda. 1
Just as the United States survived the terrible wars of the last Century and emerged stronger and more powerful than many other countries
thereafter, it can weather the criminal attacks of international terrorists
without sacrificing its principles and ideals. Indeed, it is only by transcending the fear that terrorism brings, and maintaining a steady composure and a
clear mind, that U.S. leaders can overcome this threat not only to Americans' physical safety but their emotional well-being. Torturing the alleged
terrorist; holding him in secret; transferring him across borders to shadowy
prisons in the dark of night-these actions might assuage the angry feelings
wrought by September 11th, 2001, but they are unlikely to produce much in
the way of positive good. Particularly if the individual in question happens
not to be a terrorist at all.
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